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ABSTRACT
The study examines the socio-economic determinants of the performance of
the new land cooperatives, where the main aim of the study is to test the existence of
those determinants in Egypt.
The paper starts with an introduction that highlights the economic impact of
the cooperative business sector and the importance of the economic performance of
the productive cooperatives of new lands.
Then part (I) addresses theoretical background about the agricultural cooperative
theory, then part (II) provides a review of the previous literature, while part (III)
illustrates the methodological procedures followed in this paper. Part (IV) shows the
valuation metrics. Finally, part (V) is the conclusion which summarizes the findings
of the paper.
Cooperative businesses are indisputably an important part of the Egyptian
economy. The term cooperative means an autonomous association of people united
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations
through jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise.
Consequently; the impact of cooperatives performance is an indication of the
perceived importance of this sector to the national economy through the cooperatives
roles on community development, production services, technical support, financial
responsibilities and social activities. Accordingly the study aims to identifying the
socioeconomic determinants of the performance of the new lands cooperatives.
The study applied is the multidimensional ILO/DANIDA scale of cooperative
performance including the equity capital ratio, reserve capital ratio, return on total
capital, and return on operating assets, return on equity capital and return on operating
capital. Using he socioeconomic variables: goal attainment, self reliant ratio,
marketing, annual sales, technical support, finance, training and communication.
The study was carried out on Alexandria and El-Behira governorates, and data
were collected by personal interviews using a pre tested questionnaire from 61
cooperatives using a random proportionate stratified sample. The questionnaire was
coded and data were statistically analyzed applying the discriminate analysis.
The findings displays the significant positive association ship between the
cooperative performance and the communication, self reliance ratio, annual sales and
finance of productive projects (including the industrial, agricultural, commercial
services), Increasing of marketing opportunities( local market and export) and
Cooperative technical support. Finally the 62.3% of the studied cases were correctly
classified.
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I- Introduction

A measure of the economic impact of the cooperative business sector would
be useful for many groups as they justify their investment in cooperative
development. The productive cooperatives of new lands are interested in estimates of
the business volume and economic impacts of the broad cooperative sector. These
associations can use information to underscore the importance of their membership
and to justify political support. Leaders of new lands communities are often involved
with attracting or developing value-added cooperative businesses. These individuals
are interested in forecasting economic impact to justify incentive packages. Finally,
economists and other scholars are interested in determining whether cooperatives
generate a different level of economic impact relative to alternative forms of business
organizations.

The size and economic impact of the cooperative business sector is not fully
appreciated because no complete information currently exists about the performance
of new lands cooperatives, their savings, investment, credits and economic impact, or
a readily identifiable procedure for gathering this information.

Measuring the economic performance of the productive cooperatives of new
lands would be an important contribution for several reasons. First, such a measure
will provide valuable insight for policy makers and the cooperative community about
the magnitude of the sector’s impact. By cataloging the population of cooperatives,
estimating their economic impact, and comparing it with alternative business models a
clear statement of their importance and unique role in the local, regional, and national
economy can be made. For example, productive cooperatives of new lands tend to be
locally owned and transfer the benefits of that ownership to the local community. This
potentially generates a greater economic impact than businesses that are not locally
owned and which distribute the benefits of ownership outside the community where
business is conducted. Policy makers, therefore, are interested to know if there is a
difference in the economic impact of user-owned and investor-owned businesses and
how great that difference might be.
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Second, given the dedication of multiple resources to the new lands of, such as
the local units, community development associations and the bank of development
and agriculture credit and other national programs, research is needed to measure the
national implications of such programs, specifically through the economic impact of
the productive cooperatives, on the new lands. Dedicated efforts to measure the
economic impact of cooperatives reinforces the fact that they contribute to the new
lands economy.

Third, quantifying the importance of cooperatives in many different sectors,
not just the productive cooperatives, will provide specific results that can be used to
educate the public and policymakers less familiar with cooperatives about their
impact throughout the nation.

Fourth, the measures of economic impact by cooperatives and other types of
business models, such as investor-owned companies, can be compared, providing
information to policymakers and investors as to the difference in impact between
user- and investor-owned businesses.

Finally, by creating an accurate measure of the impact of cooperatives in the
economy, analysis could be performed, using these results, to identify additional
opportunities for investment and sector growth. Such a measure would provide very
valuable analysis in a time of increasing demand for economic and social service
solutions to help address society’s critical social and economic problems. Providing
an accurate empirical analysis of the economic impact of cooperatives could point the
way towards adopting future, successful cooperative business strategies. Since the
components of the economic impact of cooperatives are complex, generating such a
measure, especially at the national level, will be challenging.

Consequently; the purpose of this paper is to discuss the socio-economic
determinants of the performance of the new land cooperatives.

II- Theoretical Background:
Strength of the Sapiro and Nourse ideas is in specifying objectives and
organizational structures for cooperatives that address the concerns of agricultural
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producers in a context of achieving a public interest role. In both schools of thought,
cooperatives provide some balancing of market power, whether affecting the terms of
trade for an industry-wide commodity, the Sapiro School, or in stimulating
competition in specific markets, the Nourse School. In their conceptions, cooperatives
capture a larger share of industry earnings for the membership, but additionally,
contribute to market or industry efficiency. In other words, their philosophies of
cooperation were grounded in a public interest perspective, as legislatively recognized
in the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922.

Sapiro and Nourse made major contributions to the practical problems of
achieving member commitment and cohesive organizations. Yet, subsequent
cooperative thought moved further into examining and modeling key facets of internal
organization, developing a more coherent theory of agricultural cooperation. Over the
years since Sapiro and Nourse, there has been some shift in emphasis from concern
with the external effects of organization to the internal or micro aspects of organizing
and sustaining cooperation. The advent of farm price support programs may have
placed some of the interest in the public policy role of cooperatives on the back
burner. In part, agricultural economists have given their attention to understanding the
issues of member commitment and efficient operations, as the cooperative movement
matured and organizations confronted major changes in their industries. To some
extent, too, the focus on internal aspects of organization in cooperative theory has
reflected new directions in economics, and perhaps the influence of that profession's
gradual division into macroeconomics for economy-wide coordination issues and a
microeconomics that has widely adopted the approach of methodological
individualism.

An excellent framework for understanding coordination and the role of
cooperatives in macro coordination was developed by James Shaffer, and he noted
that this role "... deserves a good deal more attention" (1987).

A major step in understanding the internal economics of cooperatives was
made by Emelianoff in the 1940's, with a conception of the cooperative as a form of
vertical integration (1948). Emelianoff''s attempt to construct a more comprehensive
theory of cooperation is particularly notable for its focus on the structural and
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functional relationship of members to their cooperative marketing organization that
was latter picked up and refined by Robotaka (1947) and his cadre of students, such as
Aresvik (1955). Emelianoff concluded that cooperatives represent an aggregate of
economic units (members) and are not themselves acquisitive economic units. In other
words, Emelianoff developed a conception of a cooperative as pure agency with
members as principals.

Phillips developed a model of output and pricing decisions as logically derived
from the Emelianoff-Robotka vertical integration framework. He identified a decision
rule for members to produce where their marginal costs equaled the cooperative's
marginal revenue. However, several economists have pointed out the flaws in this
model (Trifon, 1961; Sexton, 1984; Royer, 1994; and Staatz, 1994). Suboptimal
earnings would result whenever a cooperative's operations are subject to either
increasing or decreasing marginal costs, unless there were some ways that all
members could coordinate their outputs, which Phillips left unspecified.

Emelianoff, Robotka, and Phillips clarified the importance of a principal-agent
relationship in understanding cooperatives. Although this relationship is too simplistic
by itself to provide a comprehensive explanation of cooperative decision making and
governance, effective member control consists of members carrying out their role as
principals, represented by directors, with management functioning as their agents. In
the Emelianoff, Robotka, and Phillips conception of a cooperative, the answer to the
"benefits to whom" question is clear and unambiguous.

Phillips carried the logic of vertical integration into defining all member
dealings and relationships in strictly proportional terms. All contributions and benefits
are received from and returned to members in an equal ratio or proportion.
Governance is likewise based on member voting in proportion to patronage volume or
use.

The shortcomings of Phillip's output and pricing decision rules derived from
the lack of having some form of a modified theory of the firm for cooperatives. By the
1960's, Helmberger and Hoos filled this void and accomplished a re-working of
agricultural cooperative theory. Analogous to the theory of the firm, cooperatives
227

Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies
Vol. 14, September 2012

have an optimization objective, but it is to maximize benefits to members. In their
model, a cooperative maximizes the per-unit value or average price by distributing all
earnings back to members in proportion to their patronage volume or use.

There are excellent discussions of the Helmberger-Hoos model, its
contributions and comparisons with the work of Phillips in several reports and issues
of the Journal of Cooperatives (Staatz, 1989; Staatz, 1994; Royer, 1994 and Rhodes,
1995; Sexton, 1995). By providing a modified theory of the firm approach and
analyzing short run and long run decisions, the Helmberger-Hoos model identified the
incentives that can potentially exist for current members to limit the size of a
cooperative's membership. Their model revealed potential conflicts of interest if
management wants to expand a cooperative's volume in situations of decreasing
returns. When such output expansion is based on new members, it diminishes
earnings to the original or current membership. Hence, their model is both consistent
with the reality of an independent decision responsibility by management in
cooperatives and the existence of complex member control issues, that were missing
in the Phillip's model.

Several new directions in economic theory have emerged since the 1960's and
some comments on the nature of these approaches are relevant to understanding many
of the recent developments in agricultural cooperative theory and practice. Traditional
economic analysis locates the existence of profit as primarily a function of market
structure. Working with this assumption, economists traditionally tended to neglect
the internal structure of incentives in organizations (Shoemaker, 1990). It is
interesting to note that at the time Emelianoff was writing, there was a lack of an
adequate theory of enterprise. In using an analogue method of reasoning, he needed
such a definition and devoted the first part of his essay to developing a concept of
enterprise, which provided a point of contrast for conceptualizing a cooperative.

One of the advantages of applying a new institutionalist approach to
agricultural cooperatives, or business firms in general, is the understanding it offers of
organizational strategy. This method of analysis is applied by Sporleder to
understanding recent trends of vertical coordination and strategic alliances in
agriculture (Sporleder, 1992).
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A strategic aspect of relevance to many agricultural producers is the problem
of asset fixity or specificity, that may render them vulnerable to opportunistic
behavior by product purchasing firms. Williamson and other economists using a new
institutionalist approach, have identified this type of vulnerability as a rationale for
vertical integration (Williamson, 1971). It is apparent that some cooperatives provide
a response to this type of potential market failure.

Olson worked along similar lines as Buchanan in clarifying how most public
goods can only be defined for specific groups of people. In that context, a specific
group achieves a cooperative gain from their coordinated or organized actions, with
the public goods dimension being that no member can be denied access to the services
that generate the joint gains. Of course, Olson's major objective in this work was to
examine the problem of individual incentives to form cooperatives.

Both Staatz and Sexton look back to Phillips as a progenitor of coalition modeling
for agricultural cooperatives (Staatz, 1994; Sexton, 1986). The proportionality
principle in Phillip's work, keeping an equal ratio of burden to benefit sharing across
all members, is a stable coalition solution. In other words, no member has an
incentive to seek a change in the distribution rules. However, Staatz and Sexton point
out the operation of a unanimity rule in coalition solutions, and a Phillip's prescription
for proportional voting would not be necessary or justified over a one-member, onevote procedure in this regard.

Jeffrey S. Royer considers the neoclassical approach in which the value of
products and the allocation of resources are determined by the costs of production and
the tastes and preferences of consumers. Neoclassical theory relies on marginal
analysis, in which the quantity of a product that is purchased or sold is based on the
additional utility, revenue, or cost associated with the last unit.

III-

Literature review:

A review of past and recent developments in cooperative literature is an
opportunity to gain new perspectives on earlier works and renewed appreciation.
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A challenge for the cooperative members is to remain the primary beneficiary
of group action for which they originally organized and not become the "residual"
claimant in the sense of crumbs left over after all other agent groups receive their due.
This is particularly critical in organizations lacking firm board governance control and
in instances where management continues to push for sales growth involving nonmember related business activity. It becomes even more critical when cooperatives
develop large unallocated reserves based on this non-member business as noted by
Royer (1992) and Staatz (1989) that represents a form of "collective" equity.
Management invariably views this equity as the product of its rather than members'
efforts. As noted by Staatz and Royer, there is a great potential for the character of
cooperative organizations to change or be compromised in such situations,
particularly in larger complex organizations.

Some of these situations have even led to conversions to investor-owned
firms( IOFs), or to members losing control through goal inversion in which
maintaining the "corporate" values becomes more important than keeping the business
oriented to members as primary beneficiaries. Allocation practices therefore become a
central feature of effective cooperation just as governance practices are important in
organizational control. Especially noteworthy in this respect are the efforts by
Ag.First farm credit bank of Columbia, SC to emphasize patronage refunds to
member borrowers as a reward for continued cooperative business with the
cooperative banking system (Love, 1996).

A primary reason for the organization of cooperatives by farmers has been
perceived market failures. A conviction that the local farm supply was exploiting a
monopoly position or that the network of livestock business market and dealers was
hopelessly inefficient often has been the rationale for establishing a cooperative.

Cooperatives may have increasingly important roles to continue to play in
providing agricultural producers’ incentive with access to markets and an effective
vehicle for capturing value-added.
Cooperatives are necessary to provide farmers with market power and to preserve
their access to markets. This suggests that farmer cooperatives are more likely to arise
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and convey greater benefits to their members where: (a) Assets on both sides of the
market are highly specialized and/or (b) product and factor markets are fragmented,
leading to a divergence between the values of the asset in its current use and its value
in alternative uses. It also suggests that cooperatives will tend to be more prominent in
declining markets than in expanding markets because in declining markets the longterm consequences to farmers' trading partners of acting opportunistically are less
severe than in expanding markets, in which the threat of entry of competing firms is
higher. John M. Staatz*

Cooperative firms may offer certain advantages over IOFs during the early stages
of agricultural specialization. Farmer-stockholders have fewer incentives to act
opportunistically toward their own cooperative firm than they do toward an IOF
(provided that their return from the cooperative is contingent on their continued
patronage); therefore, the cooperative firm has more of an incentive than an IOF to
invest in training farmers in new production techniques.

Farmers also may vertically integrate via cooperative firms to internalize
externalities imposed on them by their trading partners. On the output side, farmers'
trading partners may pay insufficient attention to maintaining the quality of farm
products, particularly highly perishable ones, as they move through the marketing
system, thereby depressing farm-level demand for these products. On the input side,
farmers may have an incentive to integrate backward when they have no simple way
of ascertaining the quality of purchased inputs, such as by simple inspection or by
relying on the sellers' reputation. Particularly in the early stages of the
industrialization of agriculture, when purchased inputs are just becoming important in
farming and input suppliers' reputations are not well established, farmers may have a
strong incentive to integrate vertically via cooperative firms to assure input quality.

Farmers also may have an incentive to integrate vertically to provide themselves
with goods and services that no IOF has an incentive to produce due to their public
good nature. This is particularly true of the "competitive yardstick" services of farmer
cooperative firms, the benefits of which accrue not to the cooperative firm as such but
to the farmer-members as historically there has been much acceptance of E. G.
Nourse's dictum that the goal of the cooperative is to serve as a competitive yardstick231
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-a goad to investor-owned firm (IOF) competitors to keep their costs and profits in
line. (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig).

A contestable market is the one that is easily entered by new competitors. A
perfectly contestable market has two characteristics: (1) Entrants have no
disadvantages on either the cost or the demand sides as compared to the incumbents
and (2) exit can be costless if the entrant were to find the market unprofitable.
The implications are obvious. In markets in which entrants can pounce on abovecompetitive profits or inefficient cost structures, those types of market failures cannot
persist. Degree of market concentration does not matter if the incumbents must
operate in fear of being overrun by numerous entrants.

Its market failures arise either from lack of competition or from the inherent
uncertainty of future events. Thus, in perfectly contestable markets, there is no special
need or opportunity for cooperatives, as it appears that a perfectly contestable market
must have virtually no product differentiation, the incumbents must have no cost
advantage due to secret or patented processes or sole access to scarce resources.

Without significant sunk costs, the entrant is freer to switch rather than
continue to fight. Incumbents find it impossible to defend above-competitive profits
from the hit-and-run tactics of the completely mobile entrant. On the other hand, if
there will be an important sunk costs, an entrant must assess the risks of taking on
incumbents who may choose to fight. Incumbents can likely protect some extra profits
from less mobile would-be aggressors, because the latter realize that the post-entry
environment might be so inhospitable as to prevent the recovery of their sunk costs.

How well do the markets for agricultural commodities and farm supplies fit
the conditions for perfectly contestable markets? Product differentiation does play a
rather limited role in many agricultural markets because of the homogeneous nature of
farm commodities and some farm inputs. Patents and the high costs of R and D deter
entry into the manufacture of many farm chemical pesticides and heavy farm
machinery but are not important in many other farm supplies. Fixed costs appear quite
pervasive in both manufacture and distribution of supplies and in commodity
marketing. However, fixed costs are not necessarily sunk, so generalizations about
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sunk costs should be made cautiously. There is likely a continuum within agricultural
markets with a few markets that are quite contestable (very low barriers to entry and
exit), a few markets that have high barriers to entry and exit, and most markets
somewhere in between.

The likely least contestable markets- the manufacture of tractors and complex
equipments and pesticides- are markets that cooperatives have not been able to enter.
Ironically, the easiest markets for cooperatives to enter are the most contestable onesin which cooperatives have the least to offer as competitive yardsticks. Historically,
the economic accomplishments of cooperatives have been greatest in those markets of
moderate barriers—where the rewards have been worth seeking and have not been so
protected that cooperatives could not achieve them. Some parts of agriculture are
more vulnerable to even short-run exercise of market power than are others.
Producers of highly perishable commodities are especially vulnerable to even
temporary exploitation of market power by buyers. Consequently, cooperatives have
been important in fluid milk handling for example.

Baumol, Panzar, and Willig also introduce the concept of a "sustainable"
industry structure. That is the set of firms that can supply most economically the
desired industry output at a competitive price. Included are the requirements that each
firm be at equilibrium and that there exist no incentive for entry.

Sustainability is a necessary condition for equilibrium in a perfectly
contestable market. However, in markets that are imperfectly contestable,
sustainability is not a necessary condition for equilibrium. For example, an efficient
set of firms may enjoy higher-than-competitive profits behind an effective barrier to
entry. Even an inefficient set of firms may do the same. Obviously, there are limits to
the size of the profits and/or the degree of inefficiency that any given entry barrier can
protect. While there is no necessity for sustainability in many real-world markets in
which cooperatives may operate, the concept is useful in exploring various market
possibilities for cooperatives.

Under certain conditions, a cooperative is the most desirable monopoly
(monopsony) in this type of agricultural market. By the imperfectly contestable
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assumption, the incumbent is not disciplined completely by potential entrants; it has
some leeway to be inefficient and/or to enjoy above-competitive profits. If the
cooperative monopoly can match the efficiency of the IOF, then it will benefit both
consumers and farmers more than would an IOF monopoly. The reasons are argued in
another paper (Rhodes 1983).

To summarize the argument: Much of above-competitive earnings of the
cooperative go to farmer-members and the latter tend to respond with larger output,
benefiting consumers. This view is opposite the pessimistic scenario that a
cooperative provides the direction that makes farmers into an effective outputcontrolling cartel. That scenario assumes that the cooperative can direct farmers and
that all farmers are ready to go along with a cartel so that it has no free riders. Neither
assumption is likely to be met.
Thus a cooperative monopoly may be socially desirable provided it is as efficient as
an IOF counterpart. If the cooperative is substantially less efficient, the IOF may be
socially more desirable.
Market failure has been the traditional incentive for the organization of a
cooperative. The reasons already have been developed as to why sunk costs give
pause to the prudent challenger. These reasons apply more strongly to an IOF than to
a cooperative. A challenger fears being met by reduced margins--the farm supply
retailers start selling at lower prices and margins or the elevators start paying farmers
more for grain and suffering reduced margins. These reactions to an entering IOF may
mean substantial operating losses for an entrant and eventually an abandonment of its
sunk capital. In contrast, these reactions to a farmer cooperative would help farmers
as buyers or sellers even more than they hurt the margins of the cooperative. Farmers
can well afford to subsidize the operations of the cooperative that has become such an
effective competitive yardstick.

Thus the cooperative challenger logically has less fear about incumbent
reactions than does the IOF challenger. Cooperative members’ attitude may vary by
the commodity produced. Those producers of perishables may count their
vulnerability so high that they take the long view.
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Suppose that a cooperative has successfully become the only firm in this
market. It is easy to visualize some farmers organizing a second cooperative in the
name of competition **to keep the cooperative management on its toes." Such an
effort would be wasteful of resources because only one firm is sustainable in this
market. However, some members may benefit from inter cooperative competition if it
can be maintained.

In sum, provided the cooperative suffers no inefficiencies because it is a cooperative,
it is socially desirable that it be the firm in natural monopoly markets. If entry barriers
are too high, a cooperative may not be able to enter. However, a cooperative has some
advantages as an entrant. If the cooperative is one of two or more incumbents in a
natural monopoly market, it is a bit more likely to emerge as the sole survivor.
Social Service vs. Economic Philosophy of Cooperation:
From a sociological perspective, there exist some conceptual and practical
dilemmas that occur within the theory and practice of the cooperative movement and
cooperative organizations that define differing orientations between the social and
economic philosophies of cooperation. They include: 1) meaning versus service, 2)
efficiency versus democracy, and 3) bureaucratic logic versus cooperative logic. At
least three purposes of economic organizations can be identified; respectively, making
profits, providing services, and realizing meaning. Their predominance and mix tend
to vary both across and within organizations.
Exemplar organizations tend to range along a continuum from investment oriented
firms (IOFs) at the profits end, to the Kibbutz at the life meaning end. Cooperative
organizations can be found at different locations on the continuum, with a
predominance located within the service purpose, i.e. a focus on serving the greatest
numbers of people over the longest period of time (Craig , 1993; Nadeau and
Thompson, 1996). Most farm input and service cooperatives fall into this spot on the
continuum. Agricultural marketing cooperatives tend to be found between the service
and profit purpose orientation, with new generation cooperatives attempting to
preserve earnings benefits for defined membership over time. The life meaning
purpose at the other end of the continuum gives much greater focus to participation
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and democratic process. Cooperative organizations typically contain elements of all
three of these tendencies.

In short there are several interrelated polemic themes that emerge out of the
philosophy and theory of cooperation and the cooperative movement; as well as from
the practice of cooperation as realized in organizations functioning to meet internal
goals within a socio-economy. Organization for service or meaning/participation is a
central dilemma that is found internationally. The predominance of each tendency
varies across types of cooperative organizations as well as within organizations. North
American agricultural input cooperatives are primarily service cooperatives, while
conventional agricultural marketing cooperatives have a service orientation but with
an increased emphasis on earnings. Given a competitive market place, efficiency
criteria tend to drive organizational form toward bureaucratic models, and
paradoxically away from cooperative logic form. When participation declines and
organizations tend toward greater centralization of decision making (bureaucratic
logic), it becomes increasingly difficult to recognize differences in cooperative
behavior from investor oriented firm behavior ( IOF) and cooperative character can be
lost. However, to act without recognition of market imperatives (need for earnings)
can also result in the loss of cooperative presence.
This dilemma explains in large measure the root differences between the
social and economic philosophies of cooperation. Social philosophers emphasize
democratic control in the form of one-person, one-vote as the cardinal principle of
cooperation (Lambert, 1963). Economic philosophers on the other hand emphasize the
distribution of benefits in proportion to use as the cardinal principle. These
differences have been frequently articulated by cooperative leaders like Bergland and
Voorhis (1975), who feel the service and participatory end of the continuum, are lost
in cooperatives that strictly advocate a "bottom line" orientation.

IV- Methodological Procedures:
Sampling Design: The study was performed to explore the socio-economic
determinants of the performance of the new land cooperatives .The study focuses into
two governorates Alexandria and elbehira, whereas Alexandria has 3 main
cooperative regions including 21 cooperatives, and elbehira has 7cooperative regions
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including 53, thus the population of study contain 74 cooperatives (13 cooperatives
were inactivated because of legal and institutional problem) therefore they were
excluded accordingly the population of study . Hence; the entire population of study
consists of 61 of top new land cooperatives.
Measurements: The study exploited the performance of the new land cooperatives as
dependent variable and socio-economic determinants are representing 11 independent
variables:
The dependent variable: The performance of the new land cooperatives was measured
by using of the scale of ILO and DANIDA is formulating the cooperative
performance as follows:

Cooperative performance:
1- Equity capital ratio.
2- Reserve capital ratio.
3- Return on total capital.
4- Return on operating assets.
5- Return on equity capital.
6- Return on operating capital.

The variable of performance of the new land cooperatives was measured by : the
evaluation of progress at last three years, and 6 answers were designed as follows ;
(no progress) , (the progress was less than 10%), ( from 10% to 20 %), ( from 20% to
30%) , ( from 40% to 50 %) ,( more than 50%) , weighed from 1 to 6 respectively.

Socio- economic determinants:

1- Goal attainment:
A: Community development: clean water, electricity, drainage, housing, food
supply.
B: Facilitating the social organization services (local unit, extension center, local
community unit, banks, health unit and governmental organizations.)
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2- Self reliance ratio
3- Activities of productive investment
4- Increasing of marketing opportunities( local market and export) and
Increasing ( using ) the competitive ability of their members
5- Minimizing the production cost
6- Annual sales
7- Cooperative technical support
8- Development and protecting of cooperatives resources (lands improvement,
water rational utilization, modern water irrigation systems, desalination
programs and land quality adjustment)
9- Finance of productive projects (industrial, agricultural, commercial, secondary
services{ transportation, storage, grading and containing, packaging }sales
units and small business projects)
10- Training and skills improvement
11- Logistics and communication

The all items of independent variables were measured by formulated answers;
strongly agree, agree neutral, disagree and strongly disagree, weighed from 5 to 1
respectively.
Data collection: The secondary data was collected form the administrative records of
governmental authorities. And the questionnaires were pre-tested and collected by
personal interviews from January to march 2010.
V- Results

The descriptive analysis for the cooperatives performance is revealing that: the
performance of 27 cooperatives (representing 44% from the sample) was low, the
performance of 31 productive cooperative (51%) was moderate, and the performance
of 3 of studied cooperatives was high (5%). The performance of the majority of
studied cooperatives is addressed between the low and moderate performance which
is clarifying the need to an integrated action plans to develop the current productivity
and to overcome the economic, organizational and social barriers and obstacles.
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Table (1) cooperatives pe rform ance

Valid

1.00
2.00
3.00
Total

Frequenc y
27
31
3
61

Percent
44.3
50.8
4.9
100.0

Valid Percent
44.3
50.8
4.9
100.0

Cumulativ e
Percent
44.3
95.1
100.0

Discriminant analysis: the discriminant analysis is a technique for classifying a
set of observations into predefined classes. The purpose is to determine the class of an
observation based on a set of variables known as predictors or input variables. The
model is built based on a set of observations for which the classes are known. This set
of observations is sometimes referred to as the training set. Based on the training set,
the technique constructs a set of linear functions of the predictors, known as
discriminant functions, such that
L = b1x1 + b2x2 + … + bnxn + c , where the b's are discriminant coefficients,
the x's are the input variables or predictors and c is a constant.

The table shown below was generated by the selected Univariate ANOVAs.
This indicates whether there is a statistically significant difference among the
dependent variable means (studied group) for each independent variable. Only
x2,x4,x6,x7,x9 and x11 are statistically significant. The Wilks' Lambda is a statistical
criterion that is used to add or remove variables from the analysis.

Table (2) Tests of Equality of Group Means

'siliW
aLabLaL

F

giS

X1

0.975

0.735

0.484

X2

0.685

13.350

0.000

X3

0.990

0.293

0.747

X4

0.760

9.159

0.000
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X5

0.971

0.879

0.421

X6

0.676

13.921

0.000

X7

0.852

5.024

0.010

X8

0.996

0.106

0.899

X9

0.692

12.931

0.000

X10

0.999

0.042

0.959

X11

0.664

14.658

0.000

The next two tables shown below gives the percentage of the variance
accounted for by the yielded discriminant function. The significant of the function is
also shown; whereas the generated wilks, lambda was significant (Chi- square value
was 23.728)

Table (3) Eigen value
Canonical

Function

Eigen value

% of variance

Cumulative%

1

0.505a

78.3

78.3

0.579

ad

giS

2

.000

Correlation

Table (4) Wilks' Lambda
Wilks'

Test of
Function(s)
1

Lambda
46..0

Chi-square

23.728

Table (5) the standardized Canonical Discriminant analysis
Independent variables

Sig.

X11

0.8112**

X2

0.672**

X6

0.6131**

X9

0.597**
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X4

0.415*

X7

0.368*

X10

0.217

X3

0.194

X8

0.131

X5

0.102

X1

0.007

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
a
Table (6) Classification Results

Predicted Group Membership
DEP
1.00
2.00
3.00
Original Count 1.00
11
16
0
2.00
5
26
0
3.00
1
1
1
%
1.00
40.7
59.3
.0
2.00
16.1
83.9
.0
3.00
33.3
33.3
33.3
a. 62.3% of original grouped cases correctly classified.

Total
27
31
3
100.0
100.0
100.0

Conclusion
Like those of other nonprofit organizations, agricultural cooperatives in new lands are
now confronting new emerging needs and challenges from farmer-members and
markets caused by national and global changes in the 21st century. Farmer-members
want not only to sell their products as fast as possible but also with high economic
returns. Thus, it becomes the responsibility of the cooperatives to assist their members
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not only in selling their products but also at good prices. Furthermore, the new market
economies in which agricultural cooperatives operate bring about new types of
consumers who demand high-quality products at reasonable prices, and prefer healthy
and chemical-free food at international standards. They want to know the origin of the
foods they buy, and whether they are grown through socially acceptable and
environment-friendly methods. These phenomena offer both new opportunities and
also threats to agricultural cooperatives.
Although most of agricultural cooperatives in new lands remain confined to their
main functions like distribution of credit and fertilizers, and procurement of farm
products, some changes and modifications should be designed at agricultural
cooperatives to transform themselves and implement new strategies in this new
economic environment. The innovative practices as a new direction of agricultural
cooperatives in new lands are as follows:
o Electronic commerce and use of Internet. E-commerce is a new way of
commercializing products. It offers marketing of products and services via the
Internet. The new lands agricultural cooperatives should be supported to set up
their web sites for e-commerce of their products.
o Responding to the needs of the members thereby encouraging member
participation.
o Providing technical support in areas of marketing and supply.
o Enhancing higher economic returns to members through value-addition.
o Delivering adequate and timely credit facilities leading to higher productivity.
o Offering a high level of market information enabling better business decisions.
o Provide production and consumption loans to members at reasonable rate of
interest.
o Encourage savings among members by promoting savings deposits.
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